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Abstract
The extensive usage of smartphones has been the major driving force behind
a drastic increase of new security threats. The stealthy techniques used by
malware make them hard to detect with signature based intrusion detection
and anti-malware methods. In this paper, we present PIndroid|a novel
Permissions and Intents based framework for identifying Android malware
apps. To the best of our knowledge, PIndroid is the rst solution that uses
a combination of permissions and intents supplemented with multiple stages
of classiers for malware detection. Ensemble techniques are applied for
optimization of detection results. We apply the proposed approach on 1,745
real world applications and obtain 99.8% accuracy which is the best reported
to date. Empirical results suggest that our proposed framework built on
permissions and intents is eective in detecting malware applications.
Keywords: Malware classication, Permissions, Intents, Ensemble
methods, Colluding applications
1. Introduction
In the past few years, smartphones have evolved from simple mobile
phones into sophisticated mobile computers. Their capabilities make them
very well suited to personal and business related activities. Smartphones,
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particularly Android, have become the major target for mobile malware due
to our increased reliance on them for performing daily activities such as stor-
ing private data, socializing, emails, nancial transactions, shopping etc.
Android being the most widely used platform for smartphones is under
constant attacks. Existing end-point solutions such as anti-virus programs
are not capable of completely eliminating the exponentially increasing mal-
ware threats due to their reliance on signature based detection. Moreover,
resource constrained smartphones are not well suited to keep scanning for
malware. There is a need for innovative detection solutions to overcome
the current challenges of outdated signatures, code obfuscation and stealthy
techniques used by malware apps.
Androids permission model is an eective mechanism against the mis-
use of system resources and user data; however, some of Androids features
like intents can break the shield formed by the permission model. Permis-
sions and intents promote the collaboration among applications by using each
other's components and adding their permission landscape|enabling the for-
mation of colluding applications. A lot of research is done on permissions;
however intents are comparatively less investigated for malware detection.
This research gap is creating more opportunity for the evolving colluding
apps.
This work presents a novel methodology to ll the current research gap
in Android malware detection. The proposed malware detection framework
classies the apps against certain distinguishing combinations of permissions
and intents which are unique to the malware applications. These sets of
permissions and intents form an ecient detection pattern to dierentiate
between the malware and benign applications with a granularity to clas-
sify the family of malware. We evaluate the ecacy of our approach with
machine learning algorithms. A comparative study of classiers against dif-
ferent performance measures is carried out to select the best classier that
yields the most accurate results. We apply an ensemble method to build up
collaborative classication stage and obtain an optimized detection results.
Contributions. The main contributions presented in this paper are:
1. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst work that combines in-
tents and permissions for collaborative malware detection. This work
combines permissions and intents of applications to generate a dis-
tinguishing matrix that is used for ecient and accurate detection of
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malware and its associated families. Our method is capable of achieving
a 99% detection accuracy by combining permissions and intents.
2. We propose a new approach using ensemble methods to optimize the
classication results. Our results show a detection accuracy of 99.8%
by connecting multiple classiers laterally with a meta-classier.
3. We apply statistical signicance testing to investigate the correlation
between permissions and intents. We found statistical evidence of
strong correlation between permissions and intents which could be ex-
ploited to detect malware applications.
Organization. Section 2 discusses the related work, Section 3 provides an
overview of Android permission and intent mechanisms. Section 4 discusses
the analysis of permissions and intents and Section 5 presents the proposed
framework. Section 6 describes the model evaluation, experimental settings
and results. Section 7 highlights the limitations of proposed approach. Fi-
nally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
There is a plethora of research work going on Android security spanning
over vulnerability assessment, malware analysis and detection. An overview
of the current malware trend is provided in the studies of (34; 33). Malware
research leverages static, dynamic and hybrid analysis methods. In static
malware classication, properties of application are extracted by analysing
dierent features without actually running the code. In dynamic analysis,
the runtime proles of apps are generated by monitoring and collecting the
statistics related to memory consumption, CPU usage, network trac statis-
tics and battery usage. Performance of dynamic methods degrades due to
the resource constraints of mobile devices as they totally rely on runtime
execution. Another limitation of dynamic methods is their reliance on cer-
tain temporal or event trigger related dependencies. PIndroid advances the
research in Android malware detection using static analysis and machine
learning methods. Here, we provide an overview of related eorts in this
area.
Most of the detection approaches are built on permissions. (27) developed
an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) based tool which analyses
the permission used by the apps and identies the unnecessary permissions
(39; 35). This tool is aimed to help the app developer rather than malware
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detection. Similar tools: Saint in (20) and Apex in (21) also use permis-
sions to impose run-time constraints on the granted permissions. Another
permission based tool|VetDroid developed by (29) investigates the internal
usage methodology of permissions and rebuilds the permission behavior of
apps. These tools are helpful for app developers and security analysts but
they are not used for malware detection. Risks and benets associated with
permissions used by apps are analysed in (5) to help users to understand pros
and cons of the apps. They used a very limited sample size of 121 malware
apps for analysis. More recent works built on permissions are in (18) and
(15), they attained detection accuracies of 92% and 98% respectively, whereas
our approach has achieved 99.8% accuracy by combining permissions with
intents.
API calls and libc function calls are used in (23) to detect malware apps.
Their approach is tested on a limited number of malware samples i.e., 681.
Our proposed method achieves 99.8% accuracy when applied to 1745 appli-
cations. Andromaly proposed in (4) is also using API calls, system calls and
some other features for malware detection. They achieved 99% detection
but they tested their system on self- created malware applications. Hence
the performance of the tool is unknown for the real malware applications.
Crowdroid in (16) intercepts the system calls for analysis by a remote server
which uses K-means clustering to group similar data. This tool is good
for the detection of piggybacked applications only. DroidMat: proposed in
(10) is a machine learning based tool which uses API calls and permissions
to detect malware with 90% accuracy. A recent tool based on API calls
is presented in (22) which can remotely generate trace les by monitoring
the app running on mobile device. This tool can be used as a plug-in for
malware detection system based on API calls. The authors in (24) have
presented system calls based approach primarily to counter the system call
injection attacks. This approach achieves more than 90% accuracy, however
as a common drawback of all system call based approaches, this work also
needs rooting of devise to analyse the binaries of call sequences. This work is
extended in (25) by adding environment-aware malware behaviour to detect
the environment-reactive malware applications.
ICC and intents have not been explored the way permissions and APIs
have been investigated. Intent is a communication mechanism which facili-
tates to use the functionalities oered by components of applications (19) and
(1). Some very good studies are done on intents and Inter Process Communi-
cation (IPC), however the scope of those studies is limited to understanding
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the fundamentals rather than malware detection. (28) is the rst work which
has carried out a detailed investigation on IPC built on messaging systems.
They have investigated dierent types of components and their importance
in maintaining the Android security. (12) rst time presented a tool: Com-
Droid, which detects the ICC related vulnerabilities. They have investigated
ICC and associated attack surfaces. They have tested their tool on a total of
thirty applications. In (8), authors have extended their previous work: Com-
Droid by segregating the communication messages into two groups: inter and
intra-applications respectively to reduce the risks of inter application attacks.
In ((2)), authors developed a tool: JJB to check the Android components
and their interaction. They investigated the risks associated with malformed
and unexpected Intents. In a similar work in (3), some test scenarios of ICC
vulnerabilities are generated and a method for testing the communication
between the applications is presented.
3. Background on Permissions and Intents
Android uses permission and intent mechanisms to ensure the privacy of
user and security of device resources. In this section, we present a high-level
overview of Android permissions and intents.
3.1. Permissions
Permission framework plays a vital role in Android security. They control
access to the vital system resources, data and sensitive device functionality.
Dierent API calls related to device functionality are invoked with the per-
missions. Prior to the installation of an app, permissions in its manifest le
are requested as a complete set. User has to accept all the requested permis-
sions to install the app. There is no option for users who want to run new
apps to choose among the requested permissions. Once granted, the per-
missions remain for the lifetime of app until either un-installed or updated.
Users can only check the permissions of already installed applications on the
device but they cannot remove/change the permissions. A feature to change
the permissions was added in Android 4.2 but later removed through an up-
date to avoid the crashing of application if any of the required permissions
is mistakenly removed by the user.
Android permissions are categorized into four protection levels: Normal,
Dangerous, Signature and Signature or System. Android has an access mech-
anism to check the permissions of apps and ascertain if the application should
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be granted access to the protected resources (6). Normal permissions are au-
tomatically granted to the applications by the system without users knowl-
edge as these are not considered harmful for the user. Dangerous permissions
need users approval before the installation due to associated risk of privacy
leaks and access to sensitive API calls (36; 37; 38). Signature permissions are
granted only to those applications which are signed with the same certicate
which denes the permission. Signature or system permissions are granted
to applications either signed with the device manufacturer certicate or are
pre-installed on the device making them unobtainable by the third party
applications.
3.2. Intents
Intents are the basic communication mechanism used for exchanging
inter- and intra-application messages. An intent conveys an intention of
the application to perform an operation. It species the label of recipient
component, its category and the action to be performed by the recipient on
the supplied data.
Intents are of two types: Explicit and Implicit. Explicit intents specify
the component exclusively by the class name. These are mostly used by apps
to start their own components. Implicit intents do not specify a particular
component by name. An app which uses an implicit intent species the re-
quired action then the system selects the application which has the particular
component to handle the requested action. With explicit intents, the system
launches the specied component immediately whilst with implicit intents,
the system looks for the component by comparing the contents of intents
with the intent lters of applications. If there is any match between the
intent and intent lter, the component of that app is launched. In case of
multiple matching intent lters, users are sent with a dialogue box to select
the application for launching the component (7).
Intents facilitate applications with the same user ID to invoke functional-
ities of each other without separately declaring permissions for that function-
ality. This enables them to gain extra privileges by augmenting each others'
permissions.
4. Analysis of Permissions and Intents
Android has 145 permissions and 227 intents in version 4.4: API level 19
(API level is an integer value which identies the applications compatibility
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with the Android versions), whereas in API level 1, this number was less (91
permissions and 124 intents). The increase in the number of permissions and
intents has facilitated not only the increased functionality of mobile devices
but also the potential openings for malware.
We carried out detailed investigation of 1300 real malware and 445 be-
nign samples. These samples are collected from dierent ocial and third
party sources such as Contagiodump, Genome, Virus Total, Google Play
store, Appsapk and Androidmob. Malware samples are selected from dier-
ent malware types and families to obtain distinguishing features from most of
the available malware families. Benign apps are selected from dierent cate-
gories such as social, news, entertainment, nance, education, games, sports,
music and audio, telephony, messaging, shopping, banking and weather for
extracting usual patterns of normal apps.
Our investigation of the Android security framework and benign and mal-
ware samples resulted in some very interesting ndings, primarily identifying
permisions and intents as key features for malware propagation. These fea-
tures play a vital role in controlling the access to device sensitive resources.
Misused permissions and intents may facilitate the collaboration among ap-
plications to launch more sophisticated and stealthy attacks by sharing each
others capabilities and resources. We also establish that certain permissions
and intents which are frequently used by malware apps are seldom used by
benign apps. Malware families use a particular set of permissions and in-
tents targeting specic capabilities and resources. Almost all the malware
samples belonging to that particular family use a unique set of permissions
and intents.
We present our ndings in terms of how the malware applications use
permissions and intents dierently from benign applications. We also discuss
how this distinct usage pattern may be exploited to detect malware apps.
4.1. Permission Usage by Applications
There are 58 permissions out of a total of 145 which are frequently used
by the malware and benign applications whereas the remaining 87 are hardly
ever used. We can group the often used permissions as normal and danger-
ous permissions on the basis of their use and associated risk level. Exam-
ples of frequently used permissions by benign apps are: Full Network ac-
cess, Create/Add/remove/user accounts, Delete/Modify USB contents and
Read/write/modify contacts. Malware apps usually use permissions: Read
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phone status/ID, Access Network state, Send SMS/MMS, Receive boot com-
plete, Receive SMS, Delete/Modify USB contents and your location. There
are a few malware friendly permissions, which are seldom used by the benign
ones e.g., Access Network state, Receive boot complete, Restart packages,
Mount/Unmount File system, Set wallpapers, Read/write history bookmarks
of browser and Write APN settings. The top 25 permissions mostly used by
malware apps are shown in Fig.1.
The most popular benign apps such as YouTube, Skype and Viber tend
to use on average 8 to 16 permissions while this number goes down to 3 to
6 for the least popular apps. The same trend can be observed in malware
apps. The most harmful malware apps use more than 16 permissions and
least harmful use 3 to 6 permissions. Number of permissions used by the
most and least popular apps as well as the most and least harmful apps is
shown in Fig. 2.
4.2. Intent Usage by Applications
There are 35 intents out of 227 in Android version 4.4, which are fre-
quently used by apps. The most popular benign apps usually use on average
1 to 4 intents and the least popular use 1 to 2. Similarly, the most harmful
apps use a minimum of 5 and maximum of 8. Least harmful malware apps use
at least 2 or 3 intents. Fig. 3 shows the overall trend of intents usage popular
and harmful apps. Benign apps use only ACTION MAIN, CATEGORY LAUNCHER
and CATEGORY DEFAULT intents whereas malware apps usually use more in-
tents to gain extra capabilities. Mostly malware apps use BOOT COMPLETED,
ACTION CALL, ACTION BATTERY LOW, SMS RECEIVE and NEW OUTGOING CALL.
Malware apps are seen to use a few of the normal permissions and intents
whilst they use a signicant number of dangerous permissions and intents.
Benign apps show a similar trend of using only normal permissions and in-
tents. These observations suggest that permissions and intents may be useful
features to detect malware.
4.3. Threat Model
Android security framework relies on application sandboxing and per-
mission framework to maintain isolation between dierent applications. All
applications are considered as untrustworthy and each application runs as
a separate process in its own virtual machine. By default, applications are
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allowed to access only their own les and allocated resources. However, ap-
plications may get access to the sensitive device resources and user data by
acquiring permissions.
Despite their default isolation applications can communicate with each
other using intent which is a legitimate message passing system. Using this
communication mechanism, applications can share their components and re-
sources. They add their permissions to perform the operations which they are
unable to do individually. This augmentation of permissions through intents
facilitates the collaborated malicious operations by malware applications.
4.4. Correlation between permissions and intents
Correlation is a technique for investigating the relationship between two
quantitative variables. There are several correlation coecients measuring
the degree of correlation. The most common of these is the Pearson corre-
lation coecient (r), which is used to measures the strength of association
between two variables. It is obtained by dividing the covariance of the two
variables by the product of their standard deviations. Pearson's correlation
coecient has a value between -1 (perfect negative correlation) and 1 (perfect
positive correlation).
Suppose we have n malware applications, each application using X dan-
gerous permissions written as xi = fx1, x2,..., xng and Y dangerous intents
such that yi = fy1, x2,..., yng, then the Pearson correlation coecient (r)
can be calculated using equation 1.
rxy =
n
P
xiyi  
P
xi
P
yip
n
P
xi2   (
P
xi)2
p
n
P
yi2   (
P
yi)2
: (1)
Two dierent sets of malware applications are used to measure the strength
of correlation between dangerous permissions and dangerous intents. One set
consists of 200 malware applications which are randomly chosen from dier-
ent malware families and the other set consists of 20 malware applications
from same malware family. For the rst set of 200 malware applications,
the correlation coecient (r) equals 0.74, indicating a strong relationship be-
tween dangerous permissions and dangerous intents for p < 0.001. Similarly,
for the other set of 20 applications from same malware family the correlation
coecient (r) equals to 0.94, indicating a very strong correlation between
dangerous permissions and intents in case of samples belonging to same mal-
ware class. The strong correlation between the dangerous permissions and
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intents supports our conjecture about the association between permissions
and intents to launch the malware activity.
The Pearson correlation coecients of 0.74 for dierent malware families
and 0.94 for same malware families conrm the positive correlation between
permissions and intents. However, we need to perform a signicance test to
decide whether or not there is any evidence which supports or contradicts
the presence of a linear correlation in the whole population of malware appli-
cations. We use the hypothesis testing, for which we test the null hypothesis,
H0, that malware applications use the same set of permissions and intents
as the benign applications against the alternate hypothesis, H1, that mal-
ware applications do not use the same set of permissions and intents as the
benign applications. For hypothesis testing, we use the Mann-Whitney U
test with the p-value of 0.05. We calculate U1 and U2 values for both the
permissions and intents respectively using equations 2 and 3 respectively.
In following equations, R1 and R2 are the sums of ranks for permissions and
intents respectively and n1 and n2 are the sample sizes for both the variables.
U1 = R1   n1(n1 + 1)
2
; (2)
U2 = R2   n2(n2 + 1)
2
: (3)
We take the smallest of U and compare it with the critical value obtained
from the Mann-Whitney critical values table (14). We use Mann-Whitney
critical values table for small number of malware samples and Z-test for large
samples of malware applications due to limitations of number of entries in
the Mann-Whitney critical value table. With samples from same malware
family (n1= 20, n2 = 19, p=0.05, critical value = 119), the smallest U value
obtained is 87 which is less than the critical value of 119, we would reject
the null hypothesis for the malware applications belonging to same family.
For a large sample of applications belonging to dierent malware families
(n1 = n2 = 200, p=0.05, Z critical value = 1.64), we calculate z-score with
Z test. We obtain z-score of 13.0594 which is greater than Z critical value
hence suggesting the rejection of null hypothesis H0. We have very strong
statistical evidence to accept the alternate hypothesis H1, which suggests
that the malware and benign applications use dierent set of permissions and
intents. This conjecture is further veried with normal distribution testing
and classication analysis using dierent machine learning algorithms.
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The normal distribution is important for statistical inference point of view
(17). We use box plots to test whether the sample distribution is normal.
The box plots of permissions and intents related to benign and malware
applications are shown in Figures 4 and 5 respectively. The distribution
appears to be approximately normal, with the upper whiskers longer than
the Q1 to median distance and the box containing the middle 50% of the
data almost tightly grouped in the centre of the distribution.
5. Malware Classication
We describe how the data is represented and then present a detailed
description of our proposed system.
5.1. Data Representation
Our dataset consists of n applications from K classes with m features.
Let C = f1, 2,..., Kg are the set of indices of the classes, A = f1, 2,..., ng
the set of indices of the applications and F = f1, 2,.., mg the set of indices
of the features. Also, let ak, k 2 C and ak  A be the set of indices of
applications belonging to class k. Additionally, let Fj, j 2 F be the domain
of the jth feature. Let ith application, such that i 2 A is represented as
(ci, fi ) = (ci, fi,1, fi,2,..., fi,m) 2 C X F1 X...X Fm, where ci is the class
of application i such that C 2 fmalware , normalg and (fi,1, fi,2,..., fi,m) is
the number of permissions and intents used by ith applications, and fi,m 2
f0,1g which indicates if the ith application uses mth feature. We compute
the Information Gain (IG) of each feature xm against the class variable as
follows:
IG(Fi; C) =
P
f2(0;1)
P
c2(mal;nor) P (Fi = f ;C = c):log2

P (Fi=f ;C=c
P (Fi=f)P (C=c)

; (4)
Given that
P (Fi = f ;C = c) = P (Fi = f):P (C = cjFi = f); (5)
Equation (4) can be simplied as
IG(Fi; C) =
P
f2(0;1)
P
c2(mal;nor) P (Fi = f):P (C = cjFi = f):log2

P (C=cjFi=f)
P (C=c)

: (6)
Using equation (6), the features with highest IG are selected to train the
model.
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5.2. Probability Estimation
The probability of an application belonging to a particular class is calcu-
lated using Bayesian theorem:
P (C = cjF = f) = P (C = c)
Qm
i=1 P (Fi = fijC = c)P
j2(0;1) P (C = cj)
Qm
i=1 P (Fi = fijC = cj)
; (7)
An app is classied as malware if
(C = malwarejF = f) > P (C = normaljF = f): (8)
5.3. System Description
The proposed system is shown in Fig. 6. It consists of three main stages:
Feature extractor, Pre-processor and Classier.
Feature extractor analyses the applications (which are in APK le for-
mat). These les are decompressed to acquire the manifest le which is
used to extract the permissions and intents. The extractor stage consists
of two monitors which are used to measure: (i) type (normal or dangerous)
and number of each type of permissions and (ii) type (normal or dangerous)
and number of each type of intents. Permissions and intents are labelled into
four groups: normal permissions, normal intents, dangerous permissions and
dangerous intents. Dangerous permissions and dangerous intents are the ones
which are most frequently used by the malware applications whilst normal
permissions and normal intents are frequently used by the benign applica-
tions.
The pre-processor stage processes the extracted data to generate the vec-
tor dataset in an ARFF le format. The generated dataset is randomized
using unsupervised instance randomization lter for better accuracy and sent
to the classier stage.
The classier stage takes each monitored vector as input and classies
the dataset using trained classier. Six machine learning classiers: Nave
Bayesian, Decision tree, Decision Table, Random Forest, Sequential Minimal
Optimization and Multi Lateral Perceptron (MLP) are used for classication.
Their performances are also compared in terms of dierent performance met-
rics.
Finally, the reporter stage generates notications for the user based on
the classier results.
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6. Evaluation
6.1. Experimental Setting
The experiments to evaluate the proposed system are carried out on
an Intel Core i7-3520 M CPU @ 2.90 GHz, 2901 MHz machine with 8GB
RAM. Each of the classiers are evaluated with two methods: 10-fold cross-
validation and 80% split. In 10-fold cross-validation, the data set is divided
into 10 subsets and the holdout method is repeated 10 times. In each round,
one subset is taken as test set and the remaining nine subsets are combined
to form the training set. Errors of all the ten rounds are averaged out to
obtain a nal output. This method ensures that each instance is included at
least once in the test set and nine times in the training set. The nal model
is the average of all 10 iterations. The second method we use is 80% split,
which uses 80:20 ratio (80% of a dataset for training and 20% for testing).
This method is ecient but less accurate than the 10-fold method. In this
section, we only report the results obtained with the 10-fold method.
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
; (9)
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
; (10)
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FN + FP + TN
; (11)
F1  Score = 2: P recision : Recall
Precision+Recall
; (12)
AUC =
1
2

TP
TP + FN
+
TN
TN + FP

: (13)
Table 1: Confusion Matrix
Actual Class Classied as Malware Classied as Benign
Malware True Positive False Negative
Benign False Positive True Negative
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6.2. Performance Comparison of dierent Classiers
Performance of six classiers is evaluated and compared in terms of True
Positive Rate (TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), accuracy, F1-score and Area
Under Curve (AUC). These metrics are calculated using the confusion matrix
(Table 1) generated from the four measures: True Positive (TP) |the num-
ber of correctly classied instances that belong to the class, True Negative
(TN) |the number of correctly classied class instances that do not belong
to the class, False Positive (FP) |instances which were incorrectly classied
as belonging to the class and False Negative (FN) |instances which were
not classied as class instances.
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
; (14)
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
; (15)
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FN + FP + TN
; (16)
F1  Score = 2: P recision : Recall
Precision+Recall
; (17)
AUC =
1
2

TP
TP + FN
+
TN
TN + FP

: (18)
Table 2: Confusion Matrix
Actual Class Classied as Malware Classied as Benign
Malware True Positive False Negative
Benign False Positive True Negative
Table 2 lists values obtained for TPR, FPR, Precision, F1-score, recall,
AUC and model build-up time. Almost all the classiers performed good
with more than 90% of accuracy and TPR; however MLP and decision table
out performed with TPR of 0.993 and accuracy of 0.995. SMO performed the
lowest The SMO classier hasve the lowest TPR and accuracy of all the ve
classiers. Additionally, the classiers are evaluated in terms of time taken
to build up the model. The Nave Bayesian and decision tree took the least
model buildup time of 0.01 sec whereas decision table also exhibits less time
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as compared to MLP and random forest. Overall Decision table is observed
as the best classication algorithm . We achieve the best results with the
Decision table and the lowest results with SMO in terms of performance
metrics and model build up time.
Table 3: Comparison of Classication Algorithms
Algorithm TPR FPR Precision F1Score Recall AUC Time
MLP 0.993 0.006 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.996 1.18
Decision Table 0.993 0.006 0.995 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.23
Decision Tree 0.992 0.011 0.993 0.992 0.993 0.992 0.01
Nave Bayesian 0.982 0.012 0.989 0.988 0.989 0.997 0.01
Random Forest 0.982 0.007 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.989 0.43
SMO 0.952 0.033 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.978 0.24
The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is created by plotting
the TPR against FPR at various threshold settings. ROC curve is drawn only
with FPR and TPR as x and y axes respectively, which depicts relative trade-
os between true positive (benets) and false positive (costs). Generally,
the best possible method would yield a point in the upper left corner or
coordinate (0,1) of the ROC space, representing 100% sensitivity (no false
negatives) and 100% specicity (no false positives), which is also called a
perfect classication. A completely random guess would give a point along
a diagonal line from the left bottom to the top right corners, which is also
called the line of no-discrimination. Points above the diagonal represent good
classication results and points below the line poor results. ROC curve for
the Decision Table classier yields almost perfect classication results and
SMO gives less accurate results as shown in Figures 7 and 8 respectively.
6.3. Optimization with Ensemble methods
Ensemble methods combine the results of multiple machine learning al-
gorithms to improve the predictive performance (26),(13). Performance of
ensemble learning may not always be better than the individual classiers.
The stacked performance depends on the selection of classiers and methods
used to combine the output predictions (32).
We apply three ensemble methods namely Boosting, Bagging and Stack-
ing to further improve the detection results. Stacking method yields the
better results as compared to boosting and bagging. In stacking, multiple
algorithms are trained individually with the training dataset and the outputs
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of these classiers are sent to a meta-classier which is trained to combine the
predictions from individual classiers and makes a nal prediction. We use
Decision Table, MLP and Decision tree classiers at rst stage and combine
their results with three dierent schemes: Average of probabilities, Product
of probabilities and Majority voting.
Average of probabilities. It takes an average of the probabilities of each class
from the individual classiers (k=3 for three classiers) and compares which
class has greater probability such that,
Malware; ifPavg
3X
k=1
Classmalware < Pavg
3X
k=1
Classbenign; (19)
Benign; ifPavg
3X
k=1
Classmalware > Pavg
3X
k=1
Classbenign: (20)
Product of probabilities. Product of probabilities is taken from each of the
classiers and highest probability of class is assigned as:
Malware; ifPavg
3Y
k=1
Classmalware < Pavg
3Y
k=1
Classbenign; (21)
Benign; ifPavg
3Y
k=1
Classmalware > Pavg
3Y
k=1
Classbenign: (22)
Majority vote. Final result is decided based on the results obtained from
majority of the results.
Results of ensemble classication are depicted in Table 3. Product of
probabilities method gives the best results.
7. Limitations and Discussion
We currently apply static analysis approach to detect the malware appli-
cations. A dynamic analysis solution would have an advantage of detecting
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Table 4: Comparison of Ensemble results
Method TPR FPR Precision F1Score Recall AUC
Average Probability 0.972 0.012 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.982
Product Probability 0.998 0.011 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.998
Majority Vote 0.982 0.021 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.989
the malware in real-time detection. Static analysis has the advantage of
identifying the malicious behaviour which is dicult to discover at runtime.
It would be benecial to combine static and dynamic analysis in future to
leverage the advantages of both methods.
Presently the system can identify the malware applications however can-
not identify the type of malware (ransom, spying, ads, etc). Identifying the
type of malware applications would have the benet of conrming the asso-
ciated threat levels. It would help the users to understand the limitations of
using such an application.
8. Conclusion
Android security framework relies on permission and intent mechanisms
for controlling access to vital hardware and software resources. These two
features have never been combined to investigate their eectiveness in the
malware detection. This work proposes a novel malware detection method
based on these two vital security features. We have used statistical and ma-
chine learning methods to ascertain the eectiveness of our conjecture. Our
results conrm that the proposed system is very ecient and reliable for
the malware detection. This work also compares the performance of dier-
ent classication algorithms for the malware detection. Dierent ensemble
methods are also investigated and applied on the proposed model to improve
the detection accuracy. Some malware apps are also developed for Proof of
Concept (PoC) purpose and to get an insight into the modalities and com-
plexities of malware apps development.
We also investigate the Android methods used by the apps for possible
collusion and found that permissions and intents are the basic essence of col-
lusion. The fact that permissions and intents are the main features behind
the application collusion, our proposed malware detection model is partic-
ularly suitable for detection of colluding applications in addition to other
types of malware applications.
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